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Michel Henry is perhaps most often cited by contemporary Laruelleans such as John Ó 
Maoilearca, Katerina Kolozova, Anthony Paul Smith and Alexander Galloway – indeed, 
François Laruelle's system of non-standard philosophy and its univocal radical immanence 
is highly indebted to Henry's non-representationalism. Admittedly, in contrast to Laruelle's 
"heretical" Christology, Henry's theological-realist determination is astricted by the idealist 
paralogisms of a cogitativist Ego, which transpires most markedly in Henry's account of 
Faith – after all, Henry is a Jesuit phenomenologist following in the tradition of Jean-Luc 
Marion and Jean-Louis Chretien. Nonetheless, Henry's work on immanence – deanthropo-
centrized and universalized as generic – takes us much further than both Spinoza's specula-
tive immanence, which is diluted by the necessitarian world of negative determination, and 
Deleuzian immanence, which is characterized by multiplicitous difference. In The Michel 
Henry Reader, editors Scott Davidson and Frédéric Seyler weave together a comprehensive 
anthology of essays that survey Henry's phenomenology of life, stitching together an oeuv-
re than spans Marxist political philosophy, phenomenology of language, subjectivity and 
aesthetics, and ethics qua religion. 
 Rather than analyzing specific objects and phenomena, phenomenology is tasked 
with disclosing the structural manifestation and conditioned appearance of objects. Drawing 
primarily from Husserl and, consequently, Heidegger, Henry examines a kind of "pure 
phenomenology" that, contra intentionality and the inert world of visible objects, examines 
affectivity's "radical invisibility" (Henry 2019, xii). Whereas Husserl and Heidegger's ana-
lyses emphasize the self-transcending nature of appearances, for Henry appearance is never 
independent or self-reliant but, instead, genitive and denotative. Insofar as his work con-
cerns the visible world of object-manifestation (or that which, in Kantian parlance, is 







deemed "phenomena"), Henry's philosophical interest prioritizes the bodily power to act, or 
affectivity, and its relation to the subjective experience, which is always precluded from 
epistemic access. Thus, self-manifestation is a precondition for manifestation and a given 
state beyond control. Furthermore, for Henry appearance is dyadic, both a subjective 
appearance and, simultaneously, referencing a plurality of contingent appearances (horizon-
tality). 
Henry's analysis of the duality of appearance may remind readers of Laruelle's "dua-
lysis" –  indifferent  to  language,  which  seeks  to  mediate  and  correlate its exteriority,  
Laruelle's "dualysis" enacts a "cut of the real," imposing a critical distinction that affirms 
how language and thought mediate the transcendental incursion of philosophy, "cloning" 
and "fictioning" the Laruellean real vis-à-vis the diktat of transcendental thought. For Hen-
ry, the foundation of (self-)intentionality is within affectivity, which is clarified via the 
relation between immanence and transcendence, as intentionality is phenomenologically 
dependent upon affectivity and determined by horizontality, duality and transcendence. 
Thus, Henry's approach to ontology implies the primacy of affectivity, as "Auto-affection" 
determines the condition of possible appearances. Thus, Henry's central query is such: if we 
reject the Kantian position of "pure transcendence," how is it that we can know anything 
about "pure affectivity," given that it escapes consciousness and, therefore, descripti-
ve/representational conceivability? 
 Rather than ascribing to a transcendental deduction of pure affectivity, Henry's noti-
on of pure immanence denotes "ipseity," or the conceptual possession of subjectivity: "[i]n 
order to be affected by something other, subjectivity first has to affect itself" (ibid.). For 
Henry, the phenomenology of life can never access radical affective immanence explicitly 
because the phenomenology of life makes life the object of its reflection, thus introducing 
an impenetrable distance between life and the philosophizing subject. Consider the pheno-
menological tradition that spans from Descartes to Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger's 
explicit thesis delineates that life has its own kind of Being that is essentially "accessible 
only in Dasein" (ibid., 32). For Henry, such a conception of singularization is preceded by 
an originary "Ur-generation," or a fundamental and enactive auto-affection that "defines my 
essence" and "is not my doing" (ibid.). Whereas philosophy makes itself content with an 
"image of life," Henry's auto-affective immanence is, at its core, non-philosophical.  
 Despite Henry does not use the term "non-philosophy" or "non-standard philoso-
phy," his approach to phenomenology greatly informs Laruelle conception of "philo-
fiction" qua the Transcendental Decision. According to Laruelle's account, the "real" is all-







determining and physicality is categorically independent from its representations; thus, the 
"real" is irrevocably indifferent to the thought that seeks to signify it. Similarly, Henry's 
account of affective knowledge is infra-intentional and barred from theoretical conceivabi-
lity, albeit it unfolds within the experience of life itself (the invisible épreuve). For Henry, 
auto-affective transcendence-in-immanence occupies a theological nexus, akin to the "puri-
ty of absolute Life," which is carried out "without thought, without representation, without 
imagination, without perception, without conception…without being preceded in any way" 
and, thus, "without showing itself in any world" (ibid., 252-253). Radicalizing Henry's 
auto-affection, Laruelle will eventually disrobe Henry's absolute "Archi-phenomenality" 
from its constitutive determination, attributing immanence as non-thetic gnosis, whereby 
the "real" corresponds to the indeterminate and unpredictable superposition of quantum 
mechanics. 
Preceding Laruelle, Henry's formulaic account of subjectivity quite possibility estab-
lishes the most comprehensive precedent of phenomenological immanence and, therefore, 
is entirely novel. Rather than determining ontology vis-à-vis philosophy, for Henry pheno-
menology is ontology. In the essay "Incarnation," Henry distinguishes between two funda-
mental modes of appearance: "the appearing of the world" and "the appearing of life" (ibid., 
46). For Henry, the concept of incarnation is truly critical, as it introduces the question of 
possessing "a flesh" and distinguishes the foundational content of phenomenology from the 
horizon of pure exteriority and inert appearances. Unlike Heidegger's ek-stasis, the deter-
minate Event of Dasein's exceptionality, for Henry the distinction between pure phenome-
nality and phenomenon does not exist "in life," albeit the former provides access to the 
latter.  
Problematizing phenomenality's representational latticework, Henry demonstrates 
how, repeating Galileo's analysis, Descartes, in the oft-referenced "Second Meditation," 
examines radical reduction via the piece of wax to determine an extended body stripped of 
color, sound, odor, etc. By revealing the wax's sensible and axiological "layer," deracinated 
from its subjective constitution, Descartes' cogitatio reveals how affection "comes from 
somewhere else than its ek-static structure" (ibid., 49). Henry describes how, via Descartes, 
every sensible body presupposes another body that constitutes and makes representation 
possible by presupposing an extra-experiential "transcendental subjective body" without 
which the "body-object-of-the-world would not exist" (ibid., 49).  
For Henry, the fundamental fault of classical phenomenology, particularly in 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, is that the nature of this transcendental body is silhouetted 







against the horizon of representation which remains tacitly subordinated to the world. Des-
pite this body cannot be reduced to an object of perception, in traditional phenomenology 
Being is recognized in appearance. For instance, in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Dasein's 
ipseity is reduced to the process of "Self-externalization," as it is both discovered in and 
contingent upon the world. Contra Husserl and Heidegger, Henry's radical immanence 
avoids confining itself to an identity relation. Henry illuminates how Husserl's phenomeno-
logy unwittingly repeats Kant's analysis of transcendental subjectivity vis-à-vis the a priori 
conditions of possibility – much like Kant, Husserl was "constrained to take the allegedly 
‘immanent' intentional object as a transcendental guide of his subjective, and notably 
noetic, descriptions" (ibid., 99). For Husserl, the passing object's temporal presence – its 
retention and protention – constitutes subjectivity, itself, such that the Husserlian reduction 
identifies "consciousness with the consciousness of the world," or "cogitation to cogita-
tum," and "phenomenality to ek-stasis" (ibid., 102). 
Henry's approaches the arrival of subjectivity via that which is "in itself" and, there-
fore, conceives of subjectivity as auto-affection; opposing Ricoeur's hermeneutic rendering 
of the implicit and thematized unconscious, Henry's univocity is sympathetic to the Diony-
sian drive-based fundamental Ego that transpires in Schopenhauer (and Nietzsche's) Will 
and Freud's unconscious Ego. However, unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud, Henry 
does not presuppose that the unconscious can be assimilated into the structure of represen-
tation. Analyzing internal modes of apperception, Henry is particularly attendant to Freud's 
1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology, where the nervous system's excitation is deter-
mined via the representation of affection. Henry's dirempted qualification re: dyadic-
appearance transpires once more, as it corresponds to Freud's two-pronged conception of 
ontological receptivity within the organism – on one hand there is exogenous excitation, 
which maps onto "transcendental receptivity" with respect to the world, or the unfolding of 
ek-stasis; on the other hand, endogenous excitation denotes "transcendental receptivity with 
respect to oneself," or the self-receptivity of absolute subjacent auto-affection (ibid., 127). 
For Henry, drives and affects are concomitant to the theory of passive genesis and, more 
broadly, phenomenology's active and noetic consciousness. 
For Heidegger, the essence of representation is the essence of Being. Much like La-
ruelle's antimony towards philosophical decisionism, Henry's conception of subjectivity is 
that which first produces the conditions of contingency, upon which mathematization and 
scientifism are then constructed. Thus, measurement and the mathematical realm do not 
provide univocal knowledge of the real world, "for this real world itself…can only be expe-







rience and intuited within subjectivity" (ibid., 85). The body's auto-impressionality is con-
ceived of as flesh, upon which sense-experience is a secondary product; it is the intermedia-
ry moment, before sensation, where auto-affection is manifest: affectivity, therefore, has 
nothing to do with sensibility. This conception of pure (auto-)affect becomes quite clear in 
Henry's literature and is a position shared by other philosophers of immanence such as 
Deleuze (and even Spinoza) but has been muddied by "affect theory's" re-rendering of 
affectivity qua emotion/sensation. 
Henry is explicitly interested in the Marxian essence of technological exploitation. 
Revisiting Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology," Henry's interest in the 
essence of production is how it is complicit in aletheia, with technology giving form to 
unconcealment. This will also greatly influence how Laruelle eventually identifies techno-
logy with philosophy's alloying thought. In "The Concept of Being as Production," Henry 
remarks that contemporary theory "no longer gazes at truth" but, instead – in the words of 
Max Planck – aims at achieving mastery over the real through morphology, exhibiting 
causal and computational determinability that makes phenomena predictable by structuring 
objects in accordance with categorical subsumption. As Henry remarks, "[n]ature is no 
longer phusis; it is…a complex of computable forces" (ibid., 146). Henry's mention of 
automatization anticipates Chris Anderson's infamous remarks re: data science's outpou-
ching theory, making philosophy obsolete. Confronting Feuerbachian materialism and 
Hegelian idealism, Henry recalls the originally of Marxian thought, as it preserves the ori-
ginary essence of being. Despite Marx's essence of work is steeped in the (Hegelian) pro-
cess of objectification, Marx's conception of praxis fundamentally opposes the visible ob-
jectification of intuited action, universality, and exploited surplus. 
Henry's Marxian critique is to the extent that praxis designates a real action and is 
autonomous from the gaze of intuition, which "occurs somewhere else, outside action" 
(159). For Henry, Marx's truly original contribution (and his departure from Hegelianism 
and Feuerbach's thought) is in demonstrating that the process of "coming into the objectivi-
ty of a world" is not contingent upon the will to production and, thus, "lets the originary 
essence of being escape" to a radical "Outside" (ibid., 155). For Henry, praxis is an imma-
nent act; in intuition we do not act and, conversely, in action we do not intuit. Henry priori-
tizes praxis, enjoining theory as a product of praxis, such that "the object given to intuition" 
is merely the generative process of technological and economic determination. Contra He-
gel, Henry affirms that the empirical intuition of work resides in subjectivity and not in 
objectivity: "[w]ith Marx, we must say: machines do not work…for they have their site 







within objectivity, where there are only third person processes; the movement of a piston no 
more qualifies as work than the water falling in a cascade" (ibid., 162). Henry preserves 
praxis as subjective and, therefore, beyond the philosophical interpretation and representa-
tional duress of mechanization – for Henry, it is with Marx that all of philosophy is dissol-
ved. Once again, Marx's non-philosophical contributions will also be critical for Laruelle 
as, opposed to the auto-referential postulation of exchange value, Laruelle's "non-Marxist" 
formulation is grounded by the principle of physicality being independent from representa-
tion/mechanization. 
Throughout The Michel Henry Reader, we are reminded of Henry's prescience. Prio-
ritizing praxis as the actualization of bodily subjectivity, Henry describes a future scenario 
of unbounded automatization and Artificial Intelligence; this has become the subject of 
today's "accelerationism." Henry recounts an asymptotic "absolute limit of capitalism" that 
finds itself manifest under the instance of "[a]n entirely automatized system of production" 
(ibid., 164). The full scale of automatized production signifies the decline and ruin of capi-
talism, as capital is stilted upon "value and surplus-value," both of which "are produced 
exclusively by subjective labor" (ibid., 164). Henry brings to surface the question of what 
would happen when the productive forces of use-value become entirely object-based, as 
they coincide with an instrumental network realized by elaborate technology that extinguis-
hes the subjectivity of individuals. Rather than retreat into pessimism, Henry's humanist 
idealism thus unfolds, as he remarks upon a viable alternative "future life" that, opposing 
the possibility of a generalized "great malaise," reinscribes itself within "spiritual life." 
Henry's Marxism is not only determined by praxis but also the communitarian ethos, as 
radical immanence is stilted upon the transcendental possibility of "being-in-common." 
Henry is a thinker of the commons via the universal conception of conceivability: the sin-
gularity of the "we" is determined as "Selves and egos" (ibid., 260) but the condition of 
possibility establishes an inter-subjective community of the "living who share Life in com-
mon" (ibid., xx). 
For Henry there is a "transcendental me" (moi transcendantal) so long as the experi-
ence that it "has of itself is not its own doing" but, instead, is directed by self-givenness 
(ibid., 219). Henry's auto-affection qua pure phenomenality – over-throwing representation 
and language – is often cited when speaking of Laruelle's real but so, too, should we recall 
Chretien's Immemorial, from which thought is also fundamentally foreclosed. Henry re-
minds us in "Speech and Religion" "[t]hat there is no memory of the Immemorial," mean-
ing that we cannot represent it, form a memory of it, or relate to it "by any thought 







whatsoever." Much like Laruelle's "real," with Chretien's "Immemorial," the "Archi-ancient 
never turns towards thought" (ibid., 255). The Immemorial is the antecedence of life to 
living and, thus, indexes an "absolute past"; despite Chretien's theological fixture, the Im-
memorial is akin to time-without-becoming qua non-being, akin to Meillassoux's atemporal 
"hyperchaos."  
Unlike Laruelle, Henry's theological patheme spatializes the real, giving it an 
ethereal presence and terming this exteriority "Oblivion," whereby the Self's relation to life 
is preceded; the Oblivion is constitutive of the ipsiety of the Self in its absolute immanence: 
"it is only because no image of itself is interposed like a screen between it and itself that the 
Self is thrown into itself without protection," and, therefore, no memory will ever refer to 
its image and nothing separates it from itself, such that "it is this Self that is forever" (ibid., 
256-257). All-determining, this is univocal immanence of the One, the same radical imma-
nence we will see radicalized and made atheistic in Laruelle's quantum superposition. No-
netheless, non-intentional, Henry's apparaître pathétique, as pathos-filled auto-affection, 
demonstrates a non-conditional revealing that exists prior to any subject-object division (in 
opposition to ek-static appearing). As a comprehensive review of Henry's work, The Michel 
Henry Reader provides an astute selection of newly translated and curated essays that illu-
minate an exceedingly original philosopher to whom many of today's most radical thinkers 
are undoubtedly indebted. 
 
